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Abstract 
This paper reports a computational model of Boole’s discovery of Logic as a part of Mathemat- 
ics. George Boole ( 1815-1864) found that the symbols of Logic behaved as algebraic symbols, 
and he then rebuilt the whole contemporary theory of Logic by the use of methods uch as 
the solution of algebraic equations. Study of the different historical factors that influenced this 
achievement has served as background for our two main contributions: a computational repre- 
sentation of Boole’s Logic before it was mathematized; and a production system, BOOLE2, that 
rediscovers Logic as a science that behaves exactly as a branch of Mathematics, and that thus 
validates to some extent he historical explanation. The system’s discovery methods are found to 
be general enough to handle three other cases: two versions of a Geometry due to a contemporary 
of Boole, and a small subset of the Differential Calculus. @ 1997 Published by Elsevier Science 
B.V. 
1. Introduction 
In 1847, George Boole found that, by adequately representing Logic, it became a 
branch of Algebra in a precise sense: all known results in Logic (and some unknown) 
could be obtained by the use of standard mathematical techniques. Our objective has 
been to provide a coherent detailed account of this surprising discovery, both from the 
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historical and the computational point of view. Boole’s discovery was surprising be- 
cause even though there had been attempts to mathematize Logic, nobody had reached 
a full formalization, presumably because no one regarded Logic from a strict math- 
ematical point of view and applied genuine mathematical tools, as Boole did (see 
Section 2.2). 
We have studied how, plausibly, Boole arrived at his knowledge of the Method of 
Separation of Symbols (MSS). This was the contemporary name for a method which 
is a precursor of today’s abstract mathematical formalization. Also, we have studied 
how Boole extensively used the method in several branches of Calculus and Probability. 
The practice of applying the method had been and remained common among some 
mathematicians of the 18th and 19th centuries, both on the Continent and in the U.K., 
but always within recognized branches of Mathematics (see Section 2). 
We concluded that Boole’s discovery in Logic was just one more application of the 
method, but this time to a non mathematical discipline: Logic. Our next step was to 
devise a computational representation of Logic as it was presented in Boole’s Logic 
writings, in order to write a program that could discover the algebraic character of 
Logic by examining it under viewpoint of the MSS. 
Two facts were crucial for Boole’s discovery: 
(i) First, the change in representation from a philosophical view of Logic as an 
enormous complex structure of syllogisms and conditional statements, to a view 
of it as (possibly) fitting the general scheme for any branch of Algebra. Sim- 
plistically, the scheme consists of a set of very simple objects that are subjected 
to operations on numbers. 
(ii) The second fact was the successful application of the MSS to Logic, which meant 
that some (interesting) subset of properties of the operations on numbers held 
also for Logic. This made it possible to use the powerful tools of Mathematics 
on this new domain of Logic. 
Our work on representation is based on fact (i) . In all his Logic texts, Boole provided 
descriptions in terms that were susceptible to the MSS (see the remark below, and 
Sections 2.2 and 5.4). We have tried to model this part of the history by designing 
a representation which is given as input to a computational system which we named 
BOOLE (see Sections 4 and 5.4). The system execution applies the method to find that 
Logic is actually a branch of Algebra. 
The first version of the BOOLE system dealt with the task in fact (ii) above (applying 
MSS to Logic). It is a frame-based production system whose productions, the successive 
states of its working memory, and its outputs are supposed to follow Boole’s account of 
his discovery as revealed by his writings on Logic and the writings about him by his 
contemporaries. See, for instance, the “Memoir of Augustus De Morgan” [ lo], “Home 
side of a scientific mind” [ 121, or Boole’s first biography [ 161. 
But the whole of Boole’s writings (on Logic as well as on Mathematics) provides 
another idea that motivated the following step in our work. In Boole’s view, the process 
of finding whether the MSS successfully applies to a branch of science is always the 
same (see, for instance, [ 2 1 ] ) . We have exploited this idea in the design of BOOLE2, 
which incorporates the features of the previous version that refer to the MSS; this is the 
generic part of the system. However, BOOLE2 can deal not only with Logic, but with 
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other branches of science. Currently, it handles Logic, two different versions of a subset 
of Geometry that was proposed by a contemporary of Boole (see the remark below), 
and the first principles of Differential Calculus. The result is that properties similar to 
those in Logic hold for the first version of Geometry and the Calculus, although not for 
the second version of Geometry because of a non-commutativity. Thus, BOOLE2 reasons 
from the input representation of a science and verifies that some properties hold or not 
hold in that science (see Section 3). 
This work can be summarized as follows. We construe the historical discovery of 
the algebraic nature of Logic as the sum of two sudden changes. The first one is 
the representation of Logic. The second is the application of the MSS. BOOLE2 is 
designed to follow the ideas expressed in Boole’s writings. We have tried to make the 
system reproduce not only the result of the discovery, but also Boole’s account of the 
process that led to it, and so BOOLE2 reasons in a linguistic way to reproduce the 
historical discovery in Logic. Other discoveries are reached also by trying to parallel 
Boole’s results in several branches of Mathematics. BOOLE2 constitutes a computational 
explanation of the discovery in Logic, and opens a path for the study of discoveries in 
abstract sciences such as Mathematics or Logic. 
Remarks. In this paper, the terms symbolize and symbolization are equivalent to for- 
malize and formalization in the sense of verifying that a science subject matter is an 
instance of some formal system. We use symbolize rather than formalize in order to 
follow Boole, whose writings employ phrases such as “the use of symbols”, “symbolic 
expression”, “algebra of symbols”, “symbolic language”, “let us use the symbols”, or 
“the symbolical forms . . . are sufficient for the basis of a Calculus”. 
Also, the terms operation and combination depart here from common usage, because 
we wish to reflect the conception of sciences in Boole’s time. Thus, an operation means 
something close to the modern idea of operator. For instance, differentiation is an oper- 
ation of Calculus; taking the trace of a point moving through a segment is an operation 
of Geometry (“transference”) ; and selecting a class of individuals from a universe is an 
operation of Logic (“class”). The effects of the operations in these three examples are 
the well known concepts of derivative, segment, and predicate (identified with a set of 
individuals). On the other hand, we use the term combination (of operations) much in 
the sense of today’s algebraic operation. For instance, in Logic two successive acts of 
selecting individuals first from class x and then from class y (“class succession”) yield 
the class of the individuals which are both x and y. Similarly, in Geometry the trace of a 
point subjected to two movements through two different directions is a parallelogram. 4 
Finally, two successive differentiations yield a second derivative. 
2. The actual historic discovery 
Boole was an able developer of a methodological tradition begun in France during 
the second half of the 18th century, and continued in Britain during the first half of 
4 This original presentation of elementary Geometry is due to Gregory [ 141. 
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the 19th century. Arbogast, Lagrange and others worked in France [ 11, Chapter 21. 
Murphy, Greatheed, Hershel and others were British mathematicians who used the 
method [30], but in our opinion it was Gregory who more clearly expressed the 
philosophy of the method, and Boole who developed it most fully [6,21]. This tra- 
dition involved the methodological idea of separating symbols of operations from their 
subjects of application, and operating with these symbols as with algebraic entities. 
The method was called the Method of Separation of Symbols (MSS) and it was 
at the heart of Boole’s discovery and development of Logic as an algebraic disci- 
pline. 
2.1. An example of the application of the Method of Separation of Symbols 
An example from one of Gregory’s articles [ 13) serves to illustrate the MSS: Gregory 
determines the symbolic laws used in Newton’s binomial, 
(a + b)” = an + na”-‘b + “‘y ,” an-*b2 + . . . + b” 
and notes that according to Euler only the following three laws of combination of 
symbols are necessary for the general application of the binomial development: 
l Commutative law: ab = ba. 
l Distributive law: c(a + b) = cu + cb. 
l Index law: un’un = a”‘+“. 
Therefore, the development of the binomial, which in principle refers to numbers, 
is valid when the symbols a, b, n in (a + b)” represent other entities, provided they 
fulfill these three laws. Gregory states that since it can be proved that the operations 
of Differential Calculus and of the Calculus of Finite Differences are subject to these 
laws, it can be assumed that Newton’s binomial development is valid for such Calculi, 
which means that it is not necessary to repeat the proof for each particular case. Let 
us consider an example application from Gregory’s article: the determination of the nth 
derivative of a product of functions u o. The known equality 
d(u.v) du du 
-----=~--+~- 
dx dx dx 
may be written as follows, 
d(u ’ u) 
dx= (;+~),u,u,, 
where d’/dx is an operation upon L! but not upon u, and d/dx is an operation upon u 
but not upon U. Gregory states: 
. . . these operations, from their nature, are distributive and, as they are independent 
of each other, they must be commutative, hence they come under the circumstances 
to which the binomial theorem applies. 
So, the nth derivative may be considered as a power, the result being: 
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&“(u. 0) = ($ + A)“@. 0) 
= {(g)” +n(g)n-‘(&) + “‘r’,‘)(~)~-‘(~)‘+...}(u.“) 
= ud”v I n&d”-‘r: n(n - 1) d*U d”-‘v 
dx” 
-+ 
dx dx”-’ 1 * 2 
__+...~ 
dx* dx”-2 
Gregory says that the result is also valid when II is fractional or negative. Thus, 
Gregory “separates” the symbols for derivatives from the subjects of application of 
those derivatives, and operates with the former as with algebraic entities, applying to 
them Newton’s binomial formula in this particular case. 
Even though Gregory’s contribution to the method is usually recognized as substantial, 
only Boole dared to try it on a previously non mathematical discipline: Logic. The 
historical and detailed explanation of this process has been a substantial part of our 
research, which this Section 2 briefly summarizes. We then introduce a program that 
works according to our reconstruction of Boole’s discovery. 
The historical development of the method has been studied in [ l&19,30] as part of 
the history of Symbolic Calculi. More detailed accounts on Boole are in [ 6,21-23,291. 
2.2. Boole und the birth of Mathematical Logic 
Prior to Boole, there had been attempts to mathematize Logic by Leibniz (1646- 
1716), Saccheri (1667-1733), Lambert (1728-1777), and others, but the results were 
very limited. Leibniz, for instance, produced an abstract calculus of terms, attributes, 
and classes, in which the idea of membership in a class was related to logical concepts. 
Nevertheless, his calculus could not take account of negation and conjugation between 
conjunction and disjunction, among many other limitations [ 17, Chapter V] . Boole cited 
Leibniz once [5, p. 2401 in a context of the principle of contradiction, but did not cite 
Leibniz’s mathematical approach. This approach was not actually known until the first 
half of the 20th century. 
Boole’s awareness of the power of Mathematics as a calculus of symbols began early. 
In 1835, at the age of twenty, he gave an address on Newton which already contained 
ideas on the necessity of a systematic use of symbolism, and on the possibility of 
separating the use of symbols from their interpretation. In 1839, Boole met Gregory, 
who had recently founded the Cambridge Mathematical Journal. Boole submitted several 
papers for publication and Gregory saw with astonishment that Boole had developed by 
himself -influenced only by his readings of Lagrange and other French mathematicians- 
an approach to Mathematics very similar to the one developed at Cambridge. Gregory 
acquainted Boole with the properties of the MSS. Boole later acknowledged that Gregory 
was one of his inspirers, but he surpassed Gregory by making the bold guess that the 
Symbolic Calculus, and specifically the MSS, could be applied outside Mathematics, 
particularly to Logic. 
Boole’s interest in Logic dated from much earlier: “... I was induced by the interest 
which it (the controversy) inspired, to resume the almost forgotten thread of former 
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inquires” [ 3, p. 11. He renewed his interest in Logic because of the controversy be- 
tween the philosopher William Hamilton and the mathematician Augustus De Morgan. 
However, there is no evidence that Gregory had been interested in Logic. 
Boole’s exposition of the first principles of Logic at the start of his book “The 
Mathematical Analysis of Logic” [3] reveals his awareness of the interdependence 
between Logic and Language: 
That which renders Logic possible, is the existence in our minds of general notions, 
our ability to conceive of a class, and to designate its individual members by 
a common name. The theory of Logic is thus intimately connected with that of 
Language. A successful attempt o express logical propositions by symbols, the laws 
of whose combinations should be founded upon the laws of the mental processes 
which they represent, would, so far, be a step toward a philosophical language 
. . . [3, pp. 4-51. 
Thus, Logic is a language with signs and rules for combining signs. The mind forms 
the idea of a class, to which a name (a label or a sign) is given. Once signs have been 
assigned to classes belonging to a universe of discourse, the necessary next step is to 
determine the laws which the signs follow. These laws are found by investigating the 
mental processes which carry out these acts of classification. 5 The goal of determining 
laws then led to the discovery of Mathematical Logic, which Boole formulated in “The 
Mathematical Analysis of Logic” [3] as follows: 
Further, let us conceive a class of symbols x, y, z, possessed of the following 
character. The symbol x, operating upon any subject comprehending individuals or 
classes, shall be supposed to select from that subject all the X’s [individuals of 
some class] which it contains . . . When no subject is expressed, we shall suppose 
1 (The Universe) to be the subject understood, so that we shall have x = x( 1) . . . 
the product xy will represent, in succession, the selection of the class Y, and the 
selection from the class Y of such individuals of the class X as are contained in 
it, the result being the class whose members are both X’s and Y’s . . . The result of 
an act of election is independent of the grouping or classification of the subject. 
Thus it is indifferent whether from a group of objects considered as a whole, we 
select the class X, or whether we divide the group into two parts, select the X’s 
from them separately, and then connect the results in one aggregate conception. 
We may express this law mathematically by the equation x(u + u) = xu + xu . . . It 
is indifferent in what order two successive acts of election are performed ,.. The 
symbolic expression of this law is xy = yx. The result of a given act of election 
performed twice or any number of times in succession is the result of the same act 
performed once . . . supposing the same operation to be n times performed, we have 
x” = x . . . (These) laws are sufficient for the basis of a calculus. From the first of 
these it appears that elective symbols are distributive, from the second that they are 
commutative; properties which they possess in common with symbols of quantity, 
5 Similar ideas are found in “The Laws of Thought” [ 5 I, his second book on Logic, and “The Claims of 
Science” 141, a lecture delivered at Cork. These, together with “The Mathematical Analysis of Logic”, are 
the only published works of Boole on the subject. 
L. de L.edesma et al./Art$cial Intelligence 91 (1997) 281-307 281 
and in virtue of which, all the processes of common algebra are applicable to the 
present system . . . The third law X” = x we shall denominate the index law. It is 
peculiar to elective symbols and will be found of great importance . . . 
This quotation explains that Logic is a calculus governed by algebraic laws (distribu- 
tive, commutative, and index), which is the starting point for the use of the MSS. Boole’s 
entire book [ 31 completely develops an Algebraic Logic based on precisely those three 
laws. This special Algebra is elementary, its main procedure being the solution of sys- 
tems of algebraic equations. However, it is powerful: it even surpasses somewhat the 
level of Boole’s contemporary Logic (Boole proved the existence of combinations of 
premises in which there is absolutely no medium of comparison). Also, his Algebra 
should not be confused with Boolean Algebra, a different discipline, built up by Jevons, 
Peirce, Venn, and others after Boole’s death. 
Boole’s discovery was the realization that Logic is a science amenable to symboliza- 
tion, meaning that its basic operations follow the same laws of combination of symbols 
as some of the families in Symbolic Algebra. 
3. Overview of BOOLE2 
Our first program BOOLE~ succeeded in applying the MSS to Logic, and it reached 
the same conclusions as Boole at the beginning of his “Mathematical Analysis of 
Logic” [ 71. 
Since we believed that-in Boole’s view-ascertaining whether a science is symbol- 
izable (whether the MSS is applicable to it) is always the same, we undertook the task 
of generalizing ~00~~1% heuristics to make the program applicable to other sciences 
as well. Gregory’s Geometry 6 was chosen as a first test case. 
We emphasize that, even though the system does not currently handle a large number 
of case studies, it does capture an interesting level of detail for several, and it is 
potentially able to handle further cases. The separation-of-symbols heuristic has been 
consistently used since the 19th century under the name of formalization or abstraction. 
Whenever a portion of knowledge is symbolically represented and its symbols (separated 
from the particular meaning they have in their domain) are found to behave in the same 
way as those of, say, Logic, Algebra, Graph Theory, etc., a separation-of-symbols process 
has been carried out. In this sense, any science could be a candidate input for the system. 
There would always be an output, it is or is not symbolizable, if we could devise an 
appropriate representation of the science. Due to their low degree of formalization, 
Boole’s contemporary sciences are more suitable than others to the spirit of the present 
study. 
Our subsequent version, BOOLE2, uses a uniform and plausibly humanoid way of 
representing and reasoning and is able to discover that Logic, Geometry, and a subset 
of Differential Calculus are symbolizable [ 81, and that the generalization of Gregory’s 
Geometry is not symbolizable because of its lack of commutativity. BOOLE2’s repre- 
h A brief description can be found in the remark of Section I 
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Given: A science in terms of: 
l Set of operations of the science 
l Set of combinations of the science 
Return: l True if the science is symbolizable, or 
False otherwise 
l Laws that are fulfilled 
Fig. I. Formalization of BOOLE:! discovery task 
sentation and reasoning tools are intended to handle any science as a candidate for 
symbolization, provided its basic contents can be made accessible to the system. The 
generic part of the system concerns the MSS and is designed to receive some specific 
science as input: operations, combinations and the possible laws thereof. Thus the system 
becomes applicable to domains besides Logic. 
For simplicity of exposition, most examples in this paper are drawn from Logic, but 
there are parallel examples in the other domains that BOOLE2 has handled. 
BoOLE2’s starting point is the knowledge and goals prior to the discovery of a 
science being symbolizable or not, and it decides whether the discovered laws allow 
incorporating the science to the set of symbolizable sciences. The input is a description 
of a science in terms of its operations and combinations; the output is a record of its 
algebraic properties and whether it is symbolizable. Fig. 1 is a formalized depiction of 
the discovery task. 
BOOLE2 is designed to operate in a human-like manner and to be consistent with 
Boole’s account of his reasoning process. The program’s problem space consists of these 
elements: 
state space: sets of instances of operations, combinations and laws of a science, 
initial state: set of generic initial operations, and set of combinations of a science, 
goal: find out whether a state exists in which some combinations fulfill the MSS 
requirements; that is, determine whether the science is symbolizable, 
operators: 
l apply a combination to two operations, 
l check whether a combination fulfills a law, 
heuristics: a set of techniques used by a human agent in a discovery process. For 
instance, when a combination has been performed with operations 01 and 02, try 
to perform the same combination with 02 and 01 to test for commutativity. Or, in 
a different context, when two mathematical expressions are tested for equality, try 
a factoring process. 
Fulfilling the initial goal depends on reaching a number of subgoals, that in turn need 
other subgoals, and so on. The achievement of each goal simulates one step of the 
discovery process. Fig. 2 shows the top part of the subgoaling structure of BOOLE2’s 
reasoning. 7 This heuristic-guided backward process is an interpretation of the seemingly 
insightful reasoning method of Boole. 
’ The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of instances of those laws that have to appear in order to 
conclude that a science is symbolizable. 
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Incorporate science, 
if possible, to symbolization and 
Qicorcl laws 2 
Fig. 2. Top part of the subgoaling structure generated byBOOLE2 when reasoning. 
For example, the initial state in the case of Logic is: 
Set of simple operations: there is only one simple operation, called logic-class. 
Initially, three instances of this concept are generated: x, y, and z, which describe 
three simple generic operations in Logic. Each one represents the generic act of 
election idea of Boole expressed in the quotation of Section 2.2. 
Set of combinations: succession and aggregation, which are also described in Sec- 
tion 2.2 and correspond roughly to conjunction and disjunction in classical logics. 
4. Representation in BOOLE2 
A key issue in BOOLE2 is representing the input science. Most aspects are described 
in this section, but there are also science-dependent procedures and heuristics which 
are described below in Section 5. We have chosen a frame-based representation for 
concepts and a production system for actions, both implemented using a frame-based 
tool for generating production systems, FRULEKIT [ 3 11. Fig. 3 shows, as an example, 
an overview of the frames hierarchy for the science Logic. 
The hierarchy of frames has three parts: (a) static science-independent, (b) static 
science-dependent, and (c) dynamic. The static science-independent part is common to 
all sciences; its frames correspond to generic descriptions of concepts, without implying 
that every science will possess an instance of every frame. The static science-dependent 
part is specific to a science, but also consists of frames and instances that are created 
before execution of the production system. Finally, the dynamic instances are created 
by the production system. The next subsections discuss how to represent operations and 
combinations. 
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SCIENCE-------------LOGIC 
SIMPLE-OPERATION 
i 
----x ___--- 
Y 
LOGIc_CLASS __l-~-=f~~=~~~~l~~l~- z i 
RESULT-CLASS ’ - Result1 _“=~~~II~~.--_---.---, 
-----______ 
j - Result ” 
COMBINATION 
_. Succession 
PROTOTYPE-COMBINATION _ ’ _. Aggregation j 
I_ __---: Combination I __--- 
COMB~ATION_~STANCE ---.-XC-~---  - - - - - - - - i - Combination a 
_ _ + - Commutative 1 
CONTROL---------- - ContrOl 
a b C 
Fig, 3. Hierarchy ,,f frames in BOOLE2 for Logic. (a) is the static science-independent Pa& (h) is the static 
science-dependent part, and (c) is the dynamic Part. 
Frame simple-operation 
Slot Comments 
name identifier of the operation 
science science to which it belongs 
notat ion linguistic representation of the operation 
Fig. 4. Representation of the frame simple-operation. 
4. I. Representing operations 
The operations of any science are defined in terms of subclasses of a predefined 
frame called simple-operation. In Logic, the subclass of simple-operation is the 
simple operation logic-class. Similarly, in Geometry there is transference, and 
in Calculus, (partial) differentiation. Fig. 4 shows the definition of this frame 
and its slots. The first two slots are self-explanatory. The slot notation describes a 
linguistic representation of the operation that parallels the name of the operation. The 
notation is explained in detail in Section 4.2.2. 
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Frame transference 
is-a simple-operation 
I Slot Comments I 
magnitude number of dimensions of the transference 
direction directions of the transference 
Fig. 5. Representation of the frame transference 
Frame combination 
Slot Comments 
name name of the combination 
science science to which it belongs 
arithmetic-name name given to its arithmetic role 
Fig. 6. Representation of the frame combination. 
Besides inheriting all slots from their respective superclasses, all subclasses of the 
hierarchy can define new local slots. For instance, the frame transference inherits the 
slots of simple-operation and defines two new ones, as shown in Fig. 5. Initially, 
generic examples of the simple operation of the science are generated. 
Also, for each science, the so-called result operations (e.g., result-class in Logic, 
and result-transference in Geometry) are defined as simple operations. Result 
operations are used to represent the outcome of combining two simple operations, 
unlike the other simple operations which are defined at the initial state. 
4.2. Representing combinations 
The second input to BOOLE2 is the combinations for a given science. Combinations 
require more representation features, since one must describe what the system should 
do when combining two operations (application of the first operator of the problem 
space). The static character of combinations (what they are) is defined by the frames, 
whereas the dynamic character (what they do) is defined in terms of rules and func- 
tions. 
4.2.1. DeJinition of combinations 
Fig. 6 shows the static definition of the frame combination. The arithmetic-name 
is the name that the combination will receive in Algebra, once the system discovers that 
the corresponding science can be symbolized, and, therefore, that its formulae can be 
translated into Algebra and transformed using algebraic tools. The allowed slot values 
are times and plus. 
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Frame prototype-combination 
Slot 
laws 
notation-generator-l 
notation-generator-2 
result-generator 
is-a combination 
Comments 
set of laws that the combination fulfills 
generator of notation for each operation 
an alternative way of generating notations 
generator of the resulting notation 
Fig. 7. Representation of the frame prototype-combination. 
I 
-I 
Frame combination-instance 
is-a combination 
Slot Comments 
simple-operation1 the first simple-operation that is combined 
simple-operation2 the second simple-operation that is combined 
simple-operation3 sometimes there is a third optional operation 
result result of combining two simple-operations 
Fig. 8. Representation of the frame combination-instance. 
For each science, two subclasses of this frame are defined: 
prototype-combination. Represents the combinations themselves; its definition 
is in Fig. 7. For example, in Logic the two instances of the frame prototype- 
combination have values for the slot name of succession and aggregation, respec- 
tively. The generator slots refer to how the combination applies to two operations 
(how it works) ; they are explained in Section 4.2.2. The system fills the slot laws 
when discovering laws that the combination fulfills. 
combination-instance. Represents the successive applications of a combina- 
tion to different pairs of operations. For example, if BOOLE2 performs in Logic 
the succession of x and y, it generates an instance of the frame result-class, 
and an instance of the frame combination-instance that represents the appli- 
cation of this combination. Among other things, this allows the program to easily 
avoid repeating the combination on the same pair of operations in the same or- 
der. Fig. 8 shows the description of the frame. The slots simple-operation* 
represent the operations that were combined in the corresponding instance of the 
combination. 
The value of the slot result is the notation that results from applying the 
combination. Section 4.2.2 explains this in more detail. 
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Function Succession-Notation-Generator( operationl,operation2) 
name1 := operation-name(operation1); 
name2 := operation-name(operation2); 
If operation2 is a result-class 
Then Return simple-operation-notation(operation2) 
Else If name1 = name2 
Then Return ( (ALL THAT ARE name1 ) ) 
Else Return ( (name2 THAT ARE namel) 
(name2 THAT ARE NOT name1 ) ) 
Fig. 9. Function that computes notations for performing the succession of operations in Logic. 
4.2.2. Dejinition of notations 
One must also define how the combinations of a science can be computed. The 
notations described by Boole and Gregory for Logic and Geometry, and the open- 
ing chapters of Calculus textbooks, motivated our representation of their respective 
operations and combinations. For instance, based on Boole’s description of perform- 
ing the two combinations of Logic, we generated a set of notations in English which 
are similar, both in form and meaning, to Boole’s own sentences. Thus, to perform 
a combination, two functions need to be defined to describe the notations of opera- 
tions: 
Notations for representing the input operations (notation-generator). We de- 
scribe here only the notations generated for succession in Logic, but equivalent 
work has been done for aggregation and for combinations in Geometry and Cal- 
culus. Fig. 9 shows the output of the notation generator function when applying 
succession to two operations in Logic. 
For example, suppose BOOLE2 applies succession to the operations x and y. It calls 
the function Succession-Notation-Generator with the frames representing x 
and y (instances of logic-class) as arguments. Since the frame for y is not 
an instance of result-class, and since x and y are not the same, the function 
generates the following notation for y: 
((Y THAT ARE X) (Y THAT ARE NOT X)) 
while x is just represented by its name. 
Notations for representing the result (result-generator). This function takes 
as input both the name of the first operation and the notation generated for the 
second operation by notation-generator; it returns the notation that results 
from applying the combination. For example, Fig. 10 shows the result-generator 
function for succession. The result of applying succession to the two operations 
name and notation consists of all the notation elements that have name as the first 
element, or that have name as the last element and the atom ARE as the next-to-last. 
For instance, suppose the notation for the second operation is: 
N=((YTHATAREX) (YTHATARENOTX)) 
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Function Succession-Result-Generator( namelqotation) 
Result := {}; 
For n in notation do 
If name1 = first-element(n) OR 
(name1 = last-element(n) AND 
previous-to-last-element(n) = ARE) 
Then Result := Result U {n}; 
Return Result 
J 
Fig. 10. Function that computes the resulting notation after performing a succession of operations in Logic. 
Rule Succession 
If 01 is a logic-class with nl := name AND 
02 is a logic-class with n2 := name AND 
there is no instance of combination-instance with: 
name = succession; 
simple-operationl=ol; 
simple-operation2=02 
Thenn:=Succession-Notation-Generator(ol,o2); 
r := Succession-Result-Generator( nl, n); 
Create a new instance of combination-instance with: 
name = succession; 
simple-operation1 = 01; 
simple-operation2=02; 
result = r; 
Create a new instance of result-class with: 
notation = r J 
Fig. 11. Rule that performs the succession of two operations in Logic. 
The output of Succession-Result-Generator(x, N) would be: 
((Y THAT ARE X)) 
4.2.3. Dejinition of rules for the combinations 
BooLE2 needs production rules to actually compute the combinations. These rules 
implement the operator “apply a combination to two operations” of the problem space 
as defined in Section 3. The operator variables to be instantiated are: combination, 
operation 1, and operation2. The combination rules are all very similar. The left-hand side 
finds two operations (initial or the result of a previous combination) and a combination, 
such that the combination has not yet been applied to the two operations in this order. 
The right-hand side generates notations for the operations and the result, and defines two 
new instances: the corresponding result-* frame (the * stands for the simple-operation 
of the science involved), and a combination-instance frame. Fig. 11 illustrates the 
succession of two classes in Logic. 
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BOOLEZ 
Working Memory (WM) Rules Set (RS) 
Common WM 
Specific Rules Generic Rules 
Geometry RS 
Gen. Geometry RS 
Diff. Calculus RS 
Common RS 
Other Sciences WM Other Sciences RS 
Fig. 12. Architecture of BOOLE2. 
5. BOOLEZ as a production system 
~00~~2 is a production system with three classical components: working memory, 
rule set, and control. Its generic knowledge consists of a set of rules and frame de- 
scriptions common to any science, while its specific knowledge is composed of a set of 
rules and frame descriptions for each particular science. This partition into generic and 
specific is advantageous, since it allows creating a discoverer for each science, given 
the inputs for that science. Fig. 12 shows the system architecture. 
The initial facts in working memory describe the input science prior to any test of 
its algebraic character. The intermediate and final states represent the plausible mental 
states of the scientist during his or her reasoning. The generic production rules determine 
whether a given science can be symbolized or not, while the specific rules describe 
how to perform combinations in the science. The control mechanism guides BOOLE2 
towards the same kind of reasoning that is found in G. Boole’s writings. Even though 
the science-specific knowledge is contained in BOOLE2, conceptually it has the role of 
an input. 
Working memory in BOOLE2 consists of a set of frame descriptions and a set of frame 
instances. For example, Fig. 3 shows the hierarchy of frames in Logic. Working memory 
was already discussed in Section 4. The next two sections describe the production rules 
and control. 
5.1. Rule set 
The rules can be classified into the following groups: 
Recording rules. These collect all laws that are found to hold in a given science. 
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Rule Symbolizable 
If s is a science AND 
cl is a prototype-combination AND 
cl1 is commutative with combination = cl AND 
c2 is a prototype-combination AND 
cl2 is commutative with combination = c2 AND 
d is distributive with combination1 = cl; 
combination2 = ~2; 
Then Modify s with symbolizable = True; 
Modify cl with arithmetic-name = Times; 
Modify c2 with arithmetic-name = Plus 
Fig. 13. Rule that decides whether a science is symbolizable. 
General rules. These control the abstract reasoning for considering a science symbol- 
izable. They are all science independent since they embody knowledge of the MSS. For 
instance, Fig. 13 shows an example of the rule that states whether a science is sym- 
bolizable or not. It tests whether there are two combinations that are each commutative 
and jointly distribute. If so, it concludes that the science can be symbolized, and it 
renames the combinations with their respective algebraic (arithmetic) names: times and 
plus. The renaming will allow a future system (under development) to operate with any 
symbolizable science in the algebraic problem space. 
Law rules. These check the common laws for the sciences, such as commututivity, 
distributivity, idempotence, and index-idempotence. When a law rule fires, the system 
creates an instance of the frame corresponding to that law (see Fig. 3, part (c) ) , which 
asserts that the given combination fulfills the law. Other rules discover that a given 
combination does not fulfill a law, as in the case of the Generalized Geometry. The 
law rules are science-independent, except for the equality of notations test, which we 
discuss below. For example, the rule that tests commutativity looks for one combination- 
instance, the result r of applying a combination n to operations opl and 0~2, and another 
combination-instance, the result rl of applying n to the same combinations in reverse 
order, such that rl is equal to Y. 
The science-dependent boolean function equal-notation returns True if two notations 
are equal in the given science. For instance, in Logic, the function equal-notation 
returns True if: 
l The two notations are identical, or 
l The difference between the sets notation1 and notation2 is empty. The difference 
is computed by removing notation elements that are equal. Two notation elements, 
nl and n2, are equal if they are identical (nl = n2), or if the first element of n1 
equals the last element of n2, the first element of n2 equals the last element of nl, 
and NOT does not appear in either of the notation elements. 
For instance, of the following notation elements, only 1, 2 and 3 are equal. 
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Notation Element 1: (X THAT ARE Y) 
Notation Element 2 : (X THAT ARE Y) 
Notation Element 3 : (Y THAT ARE X) 
Notat ion Element 4 : (X THAT ARE NOT Y) 
Notation Element 5: (Y THAT ARE NOT X) 
The following two notations are equal: 
Notation 1: ((X THAT ARE Y) (X THAT ARE NOT Y)) 
Notation 2 : ((X THAT ARE NOT Y) (Y THAT ARE X) ) 
As another example, the equality of two notations (formulae) in the Differential 
Calculus requires that the successive application of 17 mathematical transformation 
operators (or a subset of them) to one notation yield the second notation. 
Combination rules. These science-dependent rules perform combinations over the op- 
erations of a science; these rules were already described in Section 4.2.3. 
Forced combination rules. These science-dependent rules act as problem space heuris- 
tics by selecting which combination of two operations should be tried. These rules 
peform the combination, they do not just cede control to a combination rule. For ex- 
ample, in Logic the heuristic rule forced-succession guides the system to combine 
the two operations 02 and 01, if it already has performed the opposite combination of 
01 and 02. If the results of both combinations are the same, the commutativity rule will 
then fire. This is human-like reasoning which Boole employed in his writings. More- 
over, this is the likely way that one would try to prove that a given combination is 
commutative. 
Continuation rules. These heuristic rules lead to uniformly applying the combinations. 
They prevent using the same combination twice in a row when other combinations can 
be applied instead, by giving priority to rules that did not fire during the last cycle. 
5.2. Control mechanism 
Execution is controlled by means of an agenda mechanism. Rules are organized in 
six priority levels with the more abstract rules at higher priority, and the more detailed 
rules at lower priority. In order of decreasing priority, the rule types are: recording rules, 
general rules, law rules, forced combination rules, combination rules, and continuation 
rules. 
Beginning with the highest priority, the rules are matched’ to select a rule that can 
fire. If none, then the next lower priority rules are matched, and so on. When a rule 
fires, control returns to highest priority rules. The agenda mechanism can be overriden 
with the forced combination rules and the continuation rules. 
’ FRULEKIT uses a Rete net for efficiently matching the rules. 
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5.3. Execution of the program 
BOOLE~ is initiated by loading (into working memory and rules) the science- 
independent part of the program, followed by loading the science-dependent part (refer 
to Appendix A). A set of instances of the simple operations of the science is defined 
so that they can be combined. Guided by the control mechanism, the first applicable 
combination rule fires, which leads to firing other combination, law and control rules. 
Execution ends after the genera1 rules have produced a definitive answer to the question 
of symbolizability, and the recording rules have filed the discovered laws. 
5.4. Recapitulation on the input science in BOOLE2 
We now recapitulate the previous subsections in order to provide a unified vision of 
how an input science is represented in BOOLE~, using Logic for illustration. 
For Boole and his contemporaries, the theory of Logic was similar. Except for minor 
differences, Logic consisted of Aristotelian syllogism and the theory of the conditional. 
Texts other than Boole’s were purely philosophical: they used mostly natural language 
and, for the sake of a clearer and shorter look, some occasional mathematical symbols, 
but these symbols lacked algebraic meaning and no mathematical operations involved 
them (see, for instance, [ 151 or [ 91) . In his “Mathematical Analysis of Logic”, Boole 
did not try to mathematize the whole edifice of Logic. Instead, he chose one fundamental 
operation, the act of election, and two ways of combining it, succession and aggrega- 
tion (see Section 2.2). This is not an oversimplification, since the acts of election (the 
equivalent to predicates in modern terms) and their combinations are sufficient to recre- 
ate and enlarge classical Logic. This captures essentially the entire content of Boole’s 
book. Operations and combinations are the starting point for the reasoning reported in 
his book, which we therefore mode1 in BOOLE2. 
The act of election in Logic is represented in BOOLE2 as a subclass of the predefined 
simple-operation frame, and its representation (or notation) reflects the so-called 
linguistic way of reasoning, which becomes apparent when the notation is used to 
compute the effect of combinations. A choice of different notations is allowed, to reflect 
particular deductive strategies that are found in Logic (see Sections 4.1, and 4.2.2). 
Two combination-instance frames represent he combinations of Logic, succession 
and aggregation. Their result-generator functions rely on a sophisticated examina- 
tion of the English sentences that represent the operations to be combined (Section 4.2). 
Some of the heuristics that lead to discovering the algebraic character of Logic are 
domain independent. However, testing for equality, which is a basic tool in Boole’s Logic 
and is a law rule in BOOLE2, is a science-dependent heuristic. It is implemented as the 
equal-notation boolean function, and it is the final step of any logical reasoning that 
ends in the discovery of a law (see Section 5.1). 
6. Future research 
There are two open questions on which we are beginning work, corresponding to the 
two traditional AI approaches: 
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Cognitive approach. We intend to consider further sciences as inputs to the system. 
This approach has a cognitive focus because to use a new science, one must first 
represent that science as a suitable input to the system, either by studying how scientists 
represent the concepts of their field or by designing a wholly new representation. It 
would be interesting to match the representations used in specific sciences against the 
common representation entailed by the MSS and embedded in BOOLE2. Once the system 
discovers that a science is symbolizable, that science could be input to a future system 
that is sketched as follows. 
Engineering approach. The goal would be to automate Boole’s Logic. Since Logic is 
abstractly equivalent to Algebra, it can be manipulated in terms of algebraic properties 
and reasoning. Therefore, one could build an algebraic reasoning system for proving 
theorems in Logic. Since there are many potentially symbolizable sciences, as tested 
by ~00~~2, the same “algebraic theorem prover” could be applied to reason in dif- 
ferent sciences using the common structure defined in BOOLE2. For example, proving 
a theorem in one of those sciences would be equivalent to solving a system of linear 
equations. 
7. Related work 
The main difference between BOOLE2 and other systems dealing with the discovery 
of historical laws, such as BACON, GLAUBER, STAHL and DALTON [24,25], AM 
and EURISKO [ 26-281, KEKADA [ 20,331, ARE [ 321 or CDP [ 1, pp. 46-5’73, is that 
BOOLE2 is exclusively guided by theory, instead of experimentation, i.e., it is not a 
data-driven discovery system. BOOLE2's input is not experimental data, but an abstract 
representation of some science. Further, many of its heuristics stem from theory, i.e., 
from the precise symbolic in which Boole reported his discovery of mathematical Logic. 
8. Conclusions 
Boole’s work, as we understand it, bears on four significant fields: 
l From the viewpoint of Scientific Discovery, Boole’s achievement was finding that 
Logic is symbolizable, and that its symbolic operations belong to the family of 
operations that obey commutative, distributive and (special) index laws. 
l As concerns the History of Mathematics, we have first understood the knowledge 
that Boole probably had, and the scientific and human historical circumstances. 
This understading has informed our acount of his historic discovery using the same 
terms and background that he reported. 
l In terms of Cognitive Science, our contribution has focused on human intelligence, 
seeking to abstract a theory of an intelligent process. Boole applied the method 
to some truly difficult problems in the Differential Calculus and the Calculus 
of Finite Differences. He seemed convinced that the method was a symbolical 
calculus applicable not only to other branches of Mathematics, but also to other 
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branches of knowledge, if they had any promise of being based on similar laws. 
Boole’s boldness was to imagine that human thought could be expressed in terms 
of operators that he called “elective” (since they represent “the act of election of 
a set of individuals from a universe of discourse”), and to check whether these 
operators could be combined in laws similar to algebraic laws. It is not by mere 
chance that he entitled his main logical treatise “The Laws of Thought”, and that 
in his first public appearance, in an 1835 lecture on Newton, well before he met 
Gregory, he stated that his aim was to deal with Newton’s mind rather than with 
Newton’s biography [ 2, p. 11. 
l Fourth, in terms of AI, we have found another example of an AI system that 
resembles how humans work in representing and solving problems. Boole’s writings 
report the use of abstraction and generalization (between Algebra and Logic), goal- 
driven reasoning, and deduction from a given generalization to “classify” a science 
as symbolizable. The kind of representation that appears to be used by Boole in the 
process of discovery is very important: he explained the idea of operation in Logic 
in a linguistic way, i.e., in terms of natural language sentences. This representation 
was powerful enough to yield truly general rules. These reasons motivated the use 
of such representations and methods in our computer programs. 
Our main research contributions can be summarized as follows: 
l We have performed a detailed study of George Boole’s discovery of Logic as an 
algebraic discipline by means of his application of the MSS that, at that time, had 
been used only within Mathematics. 
l This study informed our computational model BoOLE2 of the steps recounted by 
Boole in his Logic writings. The science-dependent part of BOOLE2 is a computa- 
tional representation of the subset of Logic that Boole chose to start his reasoning. 
The execution of BOOLE2 with Logic as input suggests that the system can proceed 
from the starting point-the logical definition of the act of election and the logical 
rules for combining instances of this act-to the conclusions reached by Boole him- 
self. This shows that the knowledge given to the program suffices for a plausible 
explanation of how George Boole might have made his discovery and, therefore, 
that BOOLE2 itself is an approximation to a theory of this scientific discovery. 
w ~00~~2’s methods suggest that the process is general enough to be applied to 
other sciences, by just entering their initial description. Evidence for this generality 
is provided by BOOLE2’s execution with Gregory’s Geometry and a small subset 
of the Differential Calculus, which are found symbolizable, and a generalization of 
Gregory’s Geometry, which is not. 
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Appendix A 
Below is a detailed trace of the execution of BOOLE2 on Logic (but simplified by 
removing unimportant steps). Commentary is provided. Traces for other input sciences 
are available at http: //grial. uc3m.es/Ndborrajo/boole/. 
> (load-boole 'logic) 
This initial function loads the science-independent part of the system and the specific 
part corresponding to Logic. It also stores in working memory the instances X, I: Z of 
generic simple operations of the science. 
----------> Firing production AGGREGATION-l 
****** Making the aggregation of Z and Z. 
The input notation is: 
((ALL THAT ARE Z>> and 
((ALL THAT ARE Z> 
The result is: ((ALL THAT ARE Z>> 
This rule is the first from the list of rules ready to fire. The rules at higher priority 
levels (recording, general, laws, and forced-combinations) can not yet be matched. 
This rule aggregates the simple operations Z and Z. To apply the aggregation, the rule 
first generates a notation for the two input operations, and then it generates a notation 
for their aggregation. The notation for an input simple operation is (ALL THAT ARE 
operation-name), whereas the result notation is the union of the input notations, 
in which repeated or subsumed notation elements have been removed. Finally, a new 
simple-operation Z + Z is added to the working memory. 
----------> Firing production IDEMPOTENCE 
****** Verified the idempotence of the combination AGGREGATION 
Since the result of aggregating Z and Z is equal to Z, the rule relative to idempotence 
fires. 
----------> Firing production AGGREGATION-2 
****** Making the aggregation of X and Z 
****** for making succession with Z. 
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The input notation is: 
((X THAT ARE Z> (X THAT ARE NOT Z>> and 
((ALL THAT ARE Z>> 
The result is: ((ALL THAT ARE Z> (X THAT ARE NOT Z>> 
The system is still at the combination priority level. Control has been transferred to the 
aggregation-2 rule by the continuation rules. For each combination, there may be more 
than one rule, corresponding to different ways of the intended use of the combination. 
For the example case of aggregation, there are two different ways to generate notations 
for the input operations. The first way has appeared before, and this rule corresponds to 
the second way. This rule is used when BOOLE2 plans to apply succession to the result 
of the aggregation of two operations, to test distributivity. 
----------> Firing production FORCED-AGGREGATION-l 
****** Making the forced aggregation of Z and X. 
The input notation is: 
((ALL THAT ARE Z)) and 
((ALL THAT ARE X>> 
The result is: ((ALL THAT ARE X> (ALL THAT ARE Z)) 
Since the system has earlier aggregated X and Z, the heuristic rule FORCED- 
AGGREGATION-l matches, and applies the aggregation to Z and X, in order sub- 
sequently to test the commutativity of aggregation. 
----------> Firing production COMMUTATIVE 
****** The commutative holds for the combination AGGREGATION 
Since the aggregation of X and 2 has the same resulting notation as the aggregation 
of Z and X, aggregation is commutative. Note that checking whether two notations are 
the same is not trivial step. 
----------> Firing production SUCCESSION-l 
****** Making the succession of Z and Z. 
The input notations are: 
Z and 
((ALL THAT ARE Z>) 
The result is: ((ALL THAT ARE Z>> 
Succession works like aggregation: it generates input notations, and then applies 
succession to generate a result notation. The input notations are the operation-name of 
the first operation, and (ALL THAT ARE operation-name-2) when the two operations 
are the same. 
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----------> Firing production IDEMPOTENCE 
***+** Verified the idempotence of the combination SUCCESSION 
Since the result of Z succession Z is Z, the rule for idempotence fires for the combi- 
nation succession. 
----------> Firing production SUCCESSION-2 
****** Making the succession of 2 
****** and ((ALL THAT ARE Z) (X THAT ARE NOT Z)). 
The input notations are: 
Z and 
((ALL THAT ARE Z> (X THAT ARE NOT Z>> 
The result is: ((ALL THAT ARE Z>> 
This rule is similar to SUCCESSION-l but it need not generate a notation for the 
second operation since it is just a previous result (instead of one of the operations 
initially generated) and so a notation already exists for it. 
----------> Firing production AGGREGATION-l 
****** Making the aggregation of Z and Y. 
The input notation is: 
((ALL THAT ARE Z>> and 
((ALL THAT ARE Y>> 
The result is: ((ALL THAT ARE Y> (ALL THAT ARE Z>> 
----------> Firing production FORCED-AGGREGATION-l 
****** Making the forced aggregation of Y and Z. 
The input notation is: 
((ALL THAT ARE Y>> and 
((ALL THAT ARE Z)) 
The result is: ((ALL THAT ARE Z> (ALL THAT ARE Y>> 
----------> Firing production AGGREGATION-2 
****** Making the aggregation of X and Z 
****** for making succession with Y. 
The input notation is: 
((X THAT ARE NOT Y) (X THAT ARE Y>> and 
((Z THAT ARE NOT Y> (Z THAT ARE Y>> 
The result is: ((Z THAT ARE NOT Y> (Z THAT ARE Y> 
(X THAT ARE NOT Y> (X THAT ARE Y>> 
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----------> Firing production SUCCESSION-l 
****w Making the succession of 2 and Y. 
The input notations are: 
2 and 
((Y THAT ARE 2) (Y THAT ARE NOT Z>> 
The result is: ((Y THAT ARE Z>> 
----------> Firing production FORCED-SUCCESSION-l 
****** Making the forced succession of Y and Z. 
The input notations are: 
Y and 
((Z THAT ARE Y> (Z THAT ARE NOT Y>> 
The result is: ((Z THAT ARE Y>> 
For similar reasons as in FORCED-AGGREGATION-I, once the succession of Z and 
Y is obtained, the succession of Y and Z must be performed. 
----------> Firing production COMMUTATIVE 
****** Commutativity holds for the combination SUCCESSION 
----------> Firing production FORCED-SUCCESSION-2 
****** Making the forced succession of Y and X. 
The input notations are: 
Y and 
((X THAT ARE Y> (X THAT ARE NOT Y)) 
The result is: ((X THAT ARE Y>> 
----------> Firing production FORCED-AGGREGATION-2 
****** Making the forced aggregation of YX and YZ. 
The input notation is: 
((X THAT ARE Y>> and 
((Z THAT ARE Y>> 
The result is: ((Z THAT ARE Y> (X THAT ARE Y>> 
----------> Firing production FORCED-SUCCESSION-3 
****** Making the forced succession of Y and X+Z. 
The input notations are: 
Y and 
((Z THAT ARE NOT Y> (Z THAT ARE Y> 
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(X THAT ARE NOT Y) (X THAT ARE Y>> 
The result is: ((Z THAT ARE Y> (X THAT ARE Y>> 
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----------> Firing production DISTRIBUTIVE-l 
****** The distributive holds for the 
****** combinations AGGREGATION and SUCCESSION 
----------> Firing production SYMBOLIZABLE 
****** Science LOGIC is symbolizable 
----------> Firing production INCORPORATE-SCIENCE 
****** We add science LOGIC to symbolizable sciences 
----------> Firing production INDEX-IDEMPOTENCE 
----------> Firing production RECORD-IDEMPOTENCE 
----------> Firing production RECORD-INDEX-IDEMPOTENCE 
----------> Firing production RECORD-DISTRIBUTIVE 
----------> Firing production RECORD-COMMUTATIVE 
----------> Firing production INDEX-IDEMPOTENCE 
----------> Firing production RECORD-IDEMPOTENCE 
----------> Firing production RECORD-INDEX-IDEMPOTENCE 
----------> Firing production RECORD-COMMUTATIVE 
BOOLE2 records the laws of LOGIC using its record rules, and then summarizes its 
work as follows: 
The science LOGIC is symbolizable. 
Its laws are: 
COMMUTATIVE, with respect to the combination SUCCESSION 
INDEX IDEMPOTENCE, with respect to the combination SUCCESSION 
IDEMPOTENCE, with respect to the combination SUCCESSION 
COMMUTATIVE, with respect to the combination AGGREGATION 
DISTRIBUTIVE, the SUCCESSION with respect to the AGGREGATION 
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INDEX IDEMPOTENCE, with respect to the combination AGGREGATION 
IDEMPOTENCE, with respect to the combination AGGREGATION 
----- All combinations made (in order of creation) ----- 
Z+Z ==> ((ALL THAT ARE Z)) 
x+z (Z) ==> ((ALL THAT ARE Z) (X THAT ARE NOT Z)) 'RESULTl' 
z+x ==> ((ALL THAT ARE X) (ALL THAT ARE Z)) 
Z*Z ==> ((ALL THAT ARE Z)) 
Z*RESULT ==> ((ALL THAT ARE Z)) Z*RESULTl 
Z+Y ==> ((ALL THAT ARE Y) (ALL THAT ARE Z)) 
Y+Z ==> ((ALL THAT ARE Z) (ALL THAT ARE Y)) 
X+Z (Y) ==> ((Z THAT ARE NOT Y) (Z THAT ARE Y) 
(X THAT ARE NOT Y) (X THAT ARE Y)) 'RESULT2' 
Z*Y ==> ((Y THAT ARE Z)) 
y*z ==> ((Z THAT ARE Y)) 'RESULT3' 
Y*X ==> ((X THAT ARE Y)) 'RESULT4' 
RESULT+RESULT ==> ((Z THAT ARE Y) (X THAT ARE Y>> RESULT4+RESULT3 
Y*RESULT ==> ((Z THAT ARE Y) (X THAT ARE Y)) Y*RESULT:! 
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